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THE UNITED STATES IN PAKISTAN: TOWARD A MORE UNIFIED EFFORT
-…for all the improvements of recent years, the United States interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.‖ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Although Pakistan remains at the center today, how best to achieve our aims remains a particularly complex and high-stakes problem for the United States. If anything, since 9/11, Pakistan's importance has continued to expand for both the United States and the rest of the world. And, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted, with this expansion comes a similarly increasing degree of complexity and challenge. 2 Indeed, President Obama declared that no issue on his foreign policy agenda was more important than Pakistan, which he has described as the -epicenter of the global terrorist threat that confronts the United States.‖ 3 Yet, despite the clear articulation of the importance of Pakistan, Washington's current strategy and the way we go about implementing that strategy is not working. Any gains the U.S. has bought with aid and engagement have come at an extremely high price and have been more than offset by Pakistan's tacit support for groups that continue to conduct hostile action against the U.S. and our allies.
When we think of Pakistan, we often think of Al-Qaeda and its allied transnational terrorist organizations; however, Pakistan is much more than just a counter-terrorism problem for the United States. It is the sixth-largest country in the world in terms of population. It also has a high birth rate and soon, it will be the fifthlargest country in the world. 4 When this occurs, Pakistan will also be the largest Muslim country in the world, larger than even Indonesia. Pakistan also has the fastest growing and fourth-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, with only the U.S., Russia, and China having more nuclear weapons. 5 Clearly, the relationship with Pakistan is among the most important strategic relationships for the United States. Given its geography and role on the world stage, Pakistan will remain important for the indefinite future. And, because of the challenges from within and perceived challenges from without, it will remain a major foreign policy conundrum for the U.S. despite the investment of billions of dollars in aid, three military alliances, and the high stakes of the war being fought by its Afghan neighbor and NATO. 6 How can the United States address such a complex problem? The Obama Administration recognizes that one of the most critical keys to success when dealing with multi-faceted problems like Pakistan is fostering interagency unity of effort. Indeed, recognizing that American service members cannot possibly carry the burden alone to address the complex challenges of today, the White House National Security Strategy seeks a whole of government approach to ensure that the whole of U.S. efforts abroad is greater than the sum of its parts. 7 Historically, the U.S. Government (USG) has struggled to consolidate its response to a major situation -that is, sharing relevant information in order to create unity of purpose while preserving the operational effectiveness of each separate agency or government component. The ability to tackle multi-faceted problems is difficult for any large organization, but particularly so across the spectrum of federal agencies, where the organizational cultures and ways of communicating vary widely.
While there has been much talk about the so-called interagency as if it were an entity itself, the interagency is actually an elusive concept of voluntary associations of federal departments and organizations, each having its own culture, operating procedures, jargon, and rules. There is no unifying interagency authority, except for the President, who can authoritatively sit atop the entire USG. Each federal department or federal agency has its own leader, budget, career progression, and mission. That said, there is little incentive to cooperate, and the system often rewards so-called -empire builders‖ above team players. This is best seen in the struggle for budget authority, which is usually a zero sum game. While one might think that broad governmental experience by any federal employee is a plus, service outside of one's own agency or department is rarely seen as career enhancing. All of these factors lead to a decentralized and inefficient interagency process that further complicates the USG's ability to seize opportunity and create real gains in the nuanced problem set that is today's Pakistan.
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A Closer Look at the Problem: Lack of USG Unity of Effort
As has been extensively documented, a major problem in the operation of the U.S. government is the difficulty, if not the inability, to delegate authority below the Presidential level across department and agency borders and fiefdoms. 9 In recent decades, Congress and the President -no matter the political party -have implemented a wide range of reforms to improve the horizontal integration capabilities and effectiveness of the executive branch, but with little real change. The unstated goal of this horizontal integration is to create the same unity of effort this paper examines.
Because so many problems -cut across a swath of agencies,‖ according to former White House Chief of Staff John Podesta, integrating the work of multiple departments and agencies is an increasingly significant challenge for the modern presidency. The need to integrate the activities of the departments and agencies to good effect is especially urgent in the realm of national security. Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001, prestigious national blue ribbon panels like the HartRudman Commission were pointing out the need for better interagency coordination. 10 Blue ribbon panels, years after 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, are still highlighting a persistent and debilitating lack of interagency cooperation. According to observers of the recent U.S. efforts in our current conflicts, -everywhere we looked, we found important (and obvious) issues of interagency coordination that went unattended, sensible community-wide proposals blocked by pockets of resistance, and critical disputes left to fester.‖ 11 Virtually all scholarly assessments of the national security system similarly conclude that the national security system suffers from inadequate interagency collaboration.
12
In Pakistan, lack of unity of effort hinders U.S. policy development, the credibility and continuity of USG strategic messaging, and the USG's ability to achieve its strategic objectives in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. In its evaluation of USG unity of effort in Pakistan, this study finds that there are two main faults with the U.S. approach. First, the USG has done little to engender unified effort. Second, and perhaps as a consequence of the first, the USG is pursuing various and often competing ways to achieve the President's ends in Pakistan. 
What it Takes to Achieve Interagency Unity of Effort
Improving interagency collaboration is a perennial and increasingly important issue. Virtually all serious observers of national security affairs recognize that the current structure of the national security system prohibits unity of effort, especially when the problem is a multi-agency issue. In response, an increasing number of informed commentators are recommending a number of changes to the national security system ranging from minor organizational changes to sweeping reform on the scale of Goldwater-Nichols. 18 Yet, given the scale of the problem described above, minor organizational tweaks might not be enough. Likewise, Goldwater-Nichols-type reforms, if they are even feasible, would take too long to implement in order to affect the critically important U.S. approach to today's problems in Pakistan. Clearly, to unify USG efforts in Pakistan in a timeframe that remains relevant, the USG must consider a middle ground approach that builds on the simpler steps available to unify interagency efforts in the face of this complex strategic problem. The third element, selfless cooperation, is characterized by the individual organizations agreeing that the overall shared vision and course will take precedence over the sometimes separate and competing missions of select parts of the interagency and ensure the ability to take unified action. It is easy to see how, in Pakistan, this element is also lacking. For example, while drone strikes have been effective in improving security by eliminating terrorists, the same strikes continue to be a source of friction that may, in the long run, prevent achieving U.S. stated strategic aims with regards to making Pakistan a more stable partner in the region, promoting improved prosperity instead of continued instability.
Improved unity of effort is the major requirement for USG foreign policy efforts towards Pakistan. And, good unity of effort requires mission-focused organization, shared vision and selfless cooperation; it will be useful to examine in depth how the USG has fostered -or, failed to foster -each of these three requirements. In the next section, this paper considers the history of the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship and peels back the specifics of U.S. interagency action and decisions. In doing so, this paper demonstrates that there has been limited interagency unit of effort and that any achievements that the United States has achieved were shortlived.
Analysis of USG Unity of Effort in Pakistan
The Afghanistan or Pakistan, and desk jobs in Washington or other headquarters working on the same regional issues. In time, they were expected to provide a deep bench for assignments that could significantly alter the course of the war. Nevertheless, instead of being viewed as a career enhancing, upwardly mobile assignment, the perception based on how haphazardly the first few year groups have been managed, it is more commonly believed to be a career inhibitor and something to be avoided. 24 The AFPAK Hands program promised to not only enable a mission-focused organization -a key requirement for unity of effort -it promised to develop a deep pool of manpower to serve in mission-focused organizations like the PACC. Unfortunately, since the AFPAK Hands program has become stagnant, and since the PACC is less of an interagency organization focused on the AFPAK mission as a whole, after its role during the surge debate in the USG, the true potential of the PACC as a missionfocused, interagency representative organization has never materialized and institutionalized. Clearly, by opting to take a hard-nosed approach of his own accord, National Security Advisor Jones demonstrated the USG's inability to cooperate selflessly along one particular policy approach. In doing so, he undermined the President's original stated objectives toward Pakistan and created mistrust between the U.S. and Pakistan that future trust-based approaches, like Allen's, could not mitigate. By failing to engender an atmosphere of selfless cooperation, the USG has failed to meet a third critical requirement for unity of effort.
SRAP: a Missed Opportunity to Establish Shared Vision
Aggravating Factors that Further Undermine Unity of Effort
The USG's failure to establish unity of effort toward Pakistan extends further beyond its inability to establish mission-focused organizations, establish a shared vision, and engender selfless cooperation. Indeed, two additional ways that unity of effort is undermined include the absence of a clearly articulated endstate for the region How to measure success against our strategy, however, is as of yet unclear and in this context, -we'll know it when we see it,‖ he said in reference to defining success in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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A second aggravating factor that hinders USG unity of effort is the fact that many U.S. officials fail to recognize that Pakistan's fundamental goal is to defend itself against its rival, India. As a result, every olive branch that the U.S. extends to India is felt as a slap in the face to Islamabad. Consequently, Pakistan remains doubtful that the United
States would have Pakistan's back in a conflict with India. It is no wonder that Pakistan hesitates giving up its influence with the insurgent groups, which many Pakistani officials believe will give Pakistan strategic depth in the form of a strategic assembly area for a counterattack against India in Afghanistan and an unconventional warfare capability in any future conflict with India. Therefore, Islamabad plays it both ways: it cooperates with Washington just enough to be useful, but simultaneously obstructs the coalition enough to make it near impossible to end the Afghan insurgency. 43 Yet U.S. policy seems to ignore this reality, relying on simple carrots and sticks.
At the same time, the United States seemingly develops policy toward India and Pakistan as if they were two separate policy efforts when, in fact, more could be done if they were treated with a more holistic approach. As long as U.S. agencies and officials struggle to truly understand what makes Pakistan tick, it is unlikely that the United
States will be able to act toward Pakistan with unified effort. The national security system's structural deficiency in interagency coordination is persistent but not immutable. 48 To set itself on a more effective course, the United
States should consider making three key adjustments that can help improve its unity of effort in Pakistan. Specifically, the United States could improve its mission-focused organization by establishing interagency high-performance teams; it can improve its shared vision by using Presidential leadership to make the hard-nosed approach the official U.S. approach; and, it can improve its ability to foster selfless cooperation among U.S. agencies by increasing the importance of reaching a negotiated settlement with
Taliban senior leaders -and by putting SRAP Marc Grossman at the forefront of those efforts.
Improve Mission-Focused Organization: Interagency High-Performance Teams
While federal officials clearly grasp the importance of interagency coordination and collaboration, they find it difficult to put theory into practice. It is for this reason that effective multi-agency structures are crucial. 49 Clearly, when the president successfully overrides bureaucratic conflict at the policy development stage, it is easy to see how implementation problems can arise later if presidential attention wanders. Within the case study literature, in the absence of direct and constant presidential intervention, the development and implementation of integrated national security strategies often become problematic as policy coherence declines under the weight of bureaucratic infighting, unless a pre-existing multi-agency organization is in place to mitigate it.
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The key to transformation of the national security system and the strategic management process is developing a framework that organizes, guides, connects, and sequences any specific actions within a broad left and right limit but always with the goal of moving forward towards realizing the larger vision. The Joint Staff PACC was an excellent example of such a multi-agency team; yet, as described above, it has become increasingly irrelevant.
If the USG created small interagency teams that are mission-focused and interagency-centric with a clear reporting chain of authority for the purpose of increasing collaboration across organizational boundaries and managing missions of national importance from policy through implementation and evaluation -In effect, these teams cover everything from -end-to-end,‖ then the USG could more timely generate options for U.S. senior leaders and maintain better consistency of the USG messaging to the 
Conclusion
There are no quick fixes to achieve U.S. national security interests in is not too late to unify USG efforts in a coherent and more effective approach. First, the USG could resurrect its ability to put forth a mission-focused organization by forming small interagency high-performance teams. Second, the President could establish a clear shared vision by breaking from the disingenuous, trust-based rhetoric of the past and announce a new, harder-edged approach that is more in line with the actions that
